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  Light is already a completely ideal activity that deconstructs and  
  reconstructs objects just as the light of idealism always does— 
  and so Naturphilosophie provides a physical explanation of  
  idealism, which proves that at the boundaries of nature there  
  must break forth the intelligence we see break forth in the  
  guise of humanity [Person des Menschen]. 
     
Schelling, General Deduction of Dynamic Process, § 63
1
 
 
In November of 1800 the issue of the reality of nature and its meaning for a 
transcendental philosophy interrupts, or rather heats up, the exchange of letters 
between Fichte in Berlin and Schelling in Jena. Fichte has faint praise for the 
latter‟s System of Transcendental Idealism and marks as problematic the way it 
sets nature alongside of consciousness as the subject of a genetic deduction. For 
transcendental philosophy, he insists, nature can only be something found, 
finished, perfect because lawful, but whose lawfulness is not its own, but that of 
the intelligence which beholds and explains.
2
 Schelling responds with a long 
recital of his philosophical development and poses several alternative ways that 
philosophy of nature might coincide with Wissenschaftslehre, the most radical of 
which suggests that philosophy of consciousness must be based on natural 
philosophy, not the reverse. Schelling refers to the final paragraphs of the second 
part of General Deduction of the Dynamic Process as a brief summary of his 
position.
3
 They read as if they were penned for Fichte‟s eyes, or those of his 
stand-in, Carl Eschenmayer. Beiser is correct in viewing Schelling‟s writings on 
                                                          
1 Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, Historisch-kritishe Ausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der 
Wissenschaften (Stuttgart-Bad Carnstatt: Fromann-Holzboog, 2004), I, 8, 84. Hereafter cited as 
AA, with appropriate series, volume, and page numbers. 
2 Fichte to Schelling, November 15, 1800, Correspondence (1800-1802) in J.G. Fichte/F.W.J. 
Schelling, The Philosophical Rupture between Fichte and Schelling: Selected Texts and 
Correspondence (1800-1802), ed. and trans. Michael Vater and David W. Wood (Albany: SUNY 
Press, 2012), 42. The volume is cited hereafter as PRFS.  
3 Schelling to Fichte, November 19, 1800, PRFS, 45-46. 
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nature of 1799 and 1800 as an outright realism or naturalism, quite consistent 
with the Spinozism of the 1801 Presentation of My System.
4
 
 This paper will present a brief overview of three critical texts of the early 
so-called Identity-Philosophy—the 1800 Dynamic Process, the 1801 
Presentation of My System, and the posthumously published 1804 lectures on The 
Entire System of Philosophy and the Philosophy of Nature in Particular. I 
concur, however, with Schelling‟s later judgment on his work when he deems the 
whole of his early philosophy Naturphilosophie and again refers to light as the 
phenomenon that links the world studied by the physical sciences with 
philosophy of spirit.
5
 The human is the one being where nature has come to light 
or where a God different from Spinoza‟s deus sive natura begins to manifest. All 
three of these „earlier‟ works on nature contain passages that could have been 
lifted, were it not for time‟s arrow, from the 1809 Essay on Freedom. 
 One need not rehearse Schelling‟s early essays on the philosophy of 
nature.
6
 Suffice it to say that given the state of what we now call the physical 
sciences—where in physics the materialism and experimentalism of Newton‟s 
followers overtopped the vitalism of Leibniz and Goethe, where few but 
important chemical elements were identified but largely left explained, and where 
biology was but a gleam in the eye of poets and philosophers—every essay was a 
new beginning and one was forced either to begin with Kant‟s construction of 
matter or to start at the other end and look to biological phenomena such as the 
self-reverting and self-transforming activity which Schelling calls “irritability” or 
“excitability” to find a general pattern to display the order of nature that 
intellectual intuition discovers in philosophical construction.
7
 Though Schelling 
                                                          
4 Frederick Beiser, German Idealism: the Struggle against Subjectivism—1781-1801 (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2002), 557. 
5 See On the History of Modern Philosophy, trans. Andrew Bowie (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), 119-120. Also Ian Hamilton Grant, Philosophies of Nature after Schelling 
(London, New York: Continuum, 2006), chapters 2 and 3, 26-118. 
6 See the admirable translation of Schelling‟s Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature (1797) by Harris 
and Heath. The volume contains supplements from 1803 that the translators regard as “arcane.” 
Keith Peterson adds a brief but lucid introduction to his translation of the 1799 First Outline of a 
System of the Philosophy of Nature. Frederick Beiser‟s eight chapters on Schelling in German 
Idealism: the Struggle against Subjectivism—1781-1801 put Schelling‟s ideas on nature in a 
manner accessible to current debates about materialism and neuroscience. Eckart Förster‟s two 
chapters on Schelling provide valuable information on the influence of Baader and Eschenmayer on 
Schelling‟s thinking at the turn of the century. See The Twenty-Five Years of Philosophy: A 
Systematic Reconstruction, trans. Brady Bowman (Cambridge, MA & London: Harvard University 
Press, 2012), chapter 9 and 10; hereafter cited as Twenty-Five Years. 
7 For the former alternative, see Schelling‟s1803 essay Über die Konstruction in der Philosophie 
from The Critical Journal, in Friedrich Joseph Wilhelm Schelling’s Sämmtliche Werke, ed. K. F. A. 
Schelling (Stuttgart & Augsburg: Cotta 1856-61), I/5, 126-140 [hereafter cited as SW 
series/volume, page] and also his 1802 essay “On Philosophical Construction and the Way to 
Exhibit All Things in the Absolute” in PRFS, 212-225. For the latter, see Schelling‟s attempt to 
begin Naturphilosophie with organic systems rather than inorganic matter in the 1799 First Outline 
of a System of the Philosophy of Nature, trans. Keith Peterson (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 2004), 53-69, and especially his comments on John Brown‟s discovery of excitability, 
p. 66, n.# and pp. 67-69, n.§.  
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gives over his philosophy more and more to Spinoza, both in form and content, in 
the 1801 essay and the 1804 lectures, the heart of nature remains an archetype 
intuited in its ektypes or a pattern whose self-reinforced repetition (Potenzierung) 
expands to include all the „discoveries‟ of the Newtonian “atomists” and 
“physicists.” One might smile at the naiveté of the philosopher with her few tools 
and cosmic ambitions, but even today physicists are sometimes heard to mumble 
strange things about the universe‟s fondness for order or nature‟s amenability to 
mathematics.  
 
I. 
 
The 1800 General Deduction of the Dynamic Process appeared in the first two 
issues of Schelling‟s Zeitschrift für spekulative Physik, the first half before the 
publication of the System of Transcendental Idealism, with the more ambitious 
second part following after. The first half has the aim of tightening the links 
between magnetism, electricity and chemical interaction that earlier versions of 
natural philosophy had suggested, replacing analogical connection with 
argument. The three levels of natural operation designate items which are 
primitive in nature but recursive, and as such can serve as categories of the 
utmost generality for the study of nature.
8
 Schelling initially claims that these 
categories correspond to the three dimensions of space.
9
 The second half 
strengthens the claim, maintaining that primary processes of magnetism, 
electricity, and chemical interaction coincide with the construction of matter, that 
is, determine matter‟s occupation of space.10 We shall return to this shortly. 
 Both sections of the Deduction stipulate that the endeavor of 
Naturphilosophie is to present a “genetic deduction” of nature‟s primary process, 
the outbreak of difference within identity and its subsequent suppression, or 
“nature‟s infinite striving to return to original identity.”11 There must be at least 
two forces that are opposed in matter, as Kant had argued, and they cannot differ 
merely in direction, but in quality—as positive and negative—and posited in one 
subject.
12
 The forces are never separated, so the deduction exhibits opposition 
within synthesis or synthesis within opposition,
13
 the same structure evident in 
the System of Transcendental Idealism and generally in conformity with Fichte‟s 
Wissenschaftslehre. 
 Schelling claims he is now able to advance beyond the analogical 
surmise of the First Outline of a Philosophy of Nature and establish by argument 
that magnetism is the primary form of natural operation, that it involves „action at 
a distance‟ since both expansive (positive) and retarding (negative) forces are not 
localized but spread throughout matter, that the magnetic phenomena which are 
                                                          
8 AA, I, 8, 297-98. 
9 Ibid., 298. 
10 Ibid., 318.  
11 Ibid., 300. 
12 Ibid., 299-300.  
13 Ibid., 300-302. 
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observable are only initial and incomplete versions of chemical oxidation, hence 
that primary magnetism is a property of matter as such and not tied to any 
specific “magnetic material.”14 What distinguishes the Naturphilosophie of 1800-
1804 is a simultaneous drive toward ontological generality and toward the 
reduction of physical hypotheses, e.g., the notions of “magnetic” or “electrical 
matter,” or the isolation of the so-called galvanic phenomenon from electricity 
and chemical interaction. The construction of matter is the sole task of 
Naturphilosophie, and it is an idealistic one, in that matter is a problem for 
philosophy to solve, not the postulation of a self-existent entity.
15
 
 The bulk of the first half of the Dynamic Process essay is devoted to 
developing the similarities and differences between the array of positive and 
negative forces in primary magnetism and electricity. In the former, the 
dimension of length is established, with three points sufficient to establish 
magnetism: a positive pole, a negative, and a point where the two cancel each 
other out or attain indifference. In the latter, the positive charge must be 
conceived as not as continuous but as concentrated in a single point, whereas the 
negative must be conceived as counteracting this charge from all directions. The 
schema of magnetism is the line, that of electricity the angle; they manifest both 
the outbreak and the sublation of difference within identity, or the synthesis of 
the two forces. Whereas magnetic forces work continuously through the length of 
a body, electrical forces work on the surfaces of bodies.
16
 Magnetic force is 
communicated by contact between bodies, electrical by “dispersion” or reciprocal 
attraction.
17
 
 Schelling opens the second part of this essay with some methodological 
reflections. The genetic method speculation employs takes the all-at-once or 
finished character of nature apart and displays its individual moments as a series 
of stages the subject moves through. Instead of starting out with a conceptual 
analysis of matter dependent on some definition, e.g., something impenetrable or 
occupying space and endowed with two opposing forces, one of which repels 
influence from without and one which posits an outside (or attractive) force to an 
equal degree—a synthetic deduction (or construction) will show in discrete 
stages how space is occupied to a determinate degree and will reveal the 
mechanism that effects the relationship of the two forces.
18
 Of course, it is Kant‟s 
deduction of matter in the Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft 
that Schelling means to criticize and supplant. Hitherto, e.g., in the 1797 Ideas 
for a Philosophy of Nature, he had adopted both Kant‟s starting point, the 
deduction of matter, and its analysis, something that occupies space as a result of 
the equilibrium of opposing expansive and retarding forces, although he noted 
that Newton himself was hesitant about the ontological standing of the retarding 
(attractive) force, unwilling to confess either it was an occult quality or to 
                                                          
14 Ibid., 304-305. 
15 Ibid., 324-325. 
16 Ibid., 309-312. 
17 Ibid., 317. 
18 Ibid., 318-19. 
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concede it was a pure postulate lacking an empirical basis.
19
 In 1798 Franz von 
Baader published On the Pythagorean Square in Nature, or the Four World-
Regions and took Schelling to task for his uncritical acceptance of Kant‟s 
analysis. Repulsive and attractive forces themselves were unable to account for 
the filling of space without the addition of a synthetic third item, gravity proper.
20
 
 Schelling takes over Baader‟s argument and amplifies it, but not without 
subjecting Kant‟s position to a detailed critique. To get space filled by the two 
available forces, Kant supposes that the expansive one penetrates a body and 
works outward against another at a point of contact, while a second, retarding one 
is imagined as working upon the first from all directions. The supposition 
accurately describes the two electrical forces, but it fails as an explanation of 
matter, since it presumes the existence of a body, which was the very item to be 
explained.
21
 A second criticism objects to Kant‟s adoption of empirical data 
about the expansive force to support the postulation of the opposite attractive 
force that is supposed to limit it. This can neither provide a determinate degree of 
limitation for the two forces nor a determinate degree of a body‟s occupation of 
space.
22
 A third criticism notes that if Kant had avoided begging the question by 
supposing something already existing, there is no way the postulated forces could 
remain proportional and not suppress each other or reach a point of nullity.
23
 
 Schelling gets to his (and Baader‟s) solution of adding gravity as the 
third force by demanding that the construction of space move forward and 
reconcile the apparent linear opposition of the forces in the first dimension to 
their surface-to-surface opposition in the second dimension. The construction 
moves from line to square to cube: the third unifies the first two, just as gravity 
comprehends and unifies repulsive and attractive forces. More exactly, the 
definitional “impenetrability” of matter results from a determinate degree of 
repulsive force spread over a spatial something, countered by a proportional 
degree of attractive force working at a distance or from all points. Schelling 
concludes that matter is therefore not something that exists in itself, but as a 
solution to the metaphysical problem of the construction of the spatial 
dimensions. And the same holds for authentic science: matter is not a reality in 
itself, but a solution to the mathematical problem of the relation between the two 
forces.
24
 
 What has Schelling‟s construction accomplished? It has achieved nothing 
more than the genetic explanation of space and its occupation by „something.‟ 
Only with gravity do we have a phenomenon capable of empirical notice, while 
repulsion remains behind the scene as what fills space and attraction functions as 
                                                          
19 See Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature, trans. E. Harris and P. Heath (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988), 143-49, 153-57. 
20 See Eckart Förster, The Twenty-Five Years of Philosophy, 241-47. 
21 AA, I, 8, 319-320.  
22 Ibid., 328-331. 
23 Ibid,  332-33. 
24 Ibid.,  322-325. 
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the motive force in gravity.
25
 To arrive at a richer phenomenology and provide an 
account for magnetism, electricity, and chemical process in the narrower sense as 
operations affecting some parts of nature and capable of empirical measurement, 
all the first-order processes discussed to this point—which are indeed universal 
properties of matter—must be placed below the perceptual threshold and second-
order correlates introduced for what we perceive.
26
 Schelling recalls the 
categories of the System of Transcendental Idealism in naming the first-order 
dynamic processes “productive nature” and the second-order “reproductive.” 
Whereas first-order chemical process specified the “gravity” that makes matter 
fill space, second-order gravity is the light that distinguishes phenomena for 
perception.
27
 And since light is close to thought, a “reproduction of reproduction” 
is possible in the organic world where the organism serves as the natural basis for 
intelligence.
28
 
 We cannot follow this text in further detail, but must look to its final 
section where Schelling voices his ideas about the relation of relation of 
Naturphilosophie and transcendental idealism—before they have been batted 
about in the combative back-and-forth of the Correspondence with Fichte. He 
makes at least seven distinct observations, none of which is tightly attached to the 
particular consideration of matter, space and dynamic processes previously 
discussed. 
 (1) Dynamics—the construction of matter—stands related to natural 
philosophy as transcendental explanation is related to philosophy as a whole. It 
does the heavy lifting. 
 (2) The System of Transcendental Idealism establishes parallels between 
dynamic features of inorganic mater and receptivity, sensitivity, and intuition in 
the ideal order. It thus functions as a physical proof of idealism. 
 (3) Naturphilosophie coincides with idealism inasmuch as it establishes 
the organism as the basis of reason. Idealism is nonetheless correct in 
maintaining that reason is self-positing. 
 (4) A person will learn that theoretical realism is identical with idealism 
when she comes to put her subjectivity aside. This remark is repeated in the 
Preface and the initial definition of reason in the 1801 Presentation of My 
System; the charge that Fichte‟s rendition of transcendental idealism favored 
subjectivity becomes Schelling‟s lifelong (stock-in-trade) criticism of Fichte. 
 (5) Nature can be viewed as the human species‟ “transcendental 
memory” in something akin to Plato‟s theory of anamnesis. The remark may 
prefigure the teachings of the later philosophies of freedom and of revelation that 
                                                          
25 Ibid.,  330. 
26 Ibid., 335-36. 
27 That gravity and light, along with matter-in-space, serve both as archetypal principals of nature 
and epitomes of their domains perhaps explains why Schelling will single them out for special 
treatment in a “General Philosophy of Nature” in the 1804 Naturphilosophie. Gravity, light, and 
intelligence are the ultimate potencies. 
28 Ibid., 337-339. 
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humans originated in a “ground” of nature now posited as past, but will grow into 
a spiritual future. 
 (6) Parallels between qualities in matter and sensations in mind, between 
reactions and intuition in the two orders, and between animate beings and reason 
recall the old doctrine of the human being as the center of creation. This view 
becomes central to the philosophy of freedom in 1809 and the philosophy of 
revelation of Schelling‟s later philosophy, which he began to expound in the 
1820‟s.  
 (7) Philosophy can travel two paths—from us humans towards nature, or 
from nature to us—but the true path is the one that nature has actually followed. 
This last comment is explicitly naturalistic. It is interesting that in 1804 lectures 
on nature Schelling begins to use the Anglophone word Evolution to indicate 
potentiation or level-jumping development within a given “potency” or in nature 
as a whole.
29
 
 
II. 
 
Although Schelling intended his 1801 Presentation of My System of Philosophy 
to be a complete more geometrico exposition of the entire system, difficulties 
with Christian Gabler, the publisher of his Zeitschrift für spekulative Physik, 
forced him to truncate the essay and postpone its projected completion—the 
organic nature section of the Naturphilosophie and the philosophy of spirit. A 
note where the 1801 exposition breaks off—and the 1804 Entire System lectures 
which conclude with a “Construction of the Ideal World and Its Potencies”—
provide a fair clue as to what the missing sections might have looked like,
30
 
especially since the 1804 lectures focus on Spinoza‟s Ethics almost as 
obsessively as the 1801 exposition.
31
 
 My System originated in the challenges Schelling faced from Fichte and 
Eschenmayer: from the former, whether Naturphilosophie was consistent with 
transcendental idealism or in some sense still part of the movement that traced its 
roots back to Kant‟s Critiques, from the latter, whether Naturphilosophie could 
be an independent philosophical science or whether it needed to be grounded in a 
broader metaphysics such as the Wissenschaftslehre. That Schelling adopts 
Spinoza‟s metaphysics as his model, both in form and content, shows him 
digging in his heels on the naturalism his 1799 and 1800 essays had displayed. 
That a “metaphysics of identity” is deployed to ground philosophy of nature and 
unite it with an explanation of the potencies and the individuals of appearance 
shows that he understood the force of Eschenmayer‟s objection that 
Naturphilosophie was a premature science.
32
 
                                                          
29 Ibid., 364-66. 
30 See PRFS, 205. See also SW, I/6, 495-576. 
31 For an overview of the 1801 Presentation, see Michael Vater, “Schelling‟s Philosophy of 
Identity and Spinoza‟s Ethica more geometrico,” in Spinoza and German Idealism, ed. Eckart 
Förster and Yitzhak Melamed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 156-174. 
32 See Vater and Wood, “Introduction to the Texts of F. W. J. Schelling,” PRFS, 135-140. 
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 In the course of the serious disputes that characterize their letters from 
late in the autumn of 1800 onwards, Schelling sent Fichte issues of his Zeitschrift 
für spekulative Physik that contained the second part of the Dynamic Process 
treatise and the Presentation of My System. We have no idea whether Fichte read 
the former, but he took detailed notes on the later—until he stopped at the 
boundary between metaphysics and philosophy of nature, § 51: “The first relative 
totality is matter.”33 He showed good sense as a reader, in some respects, though 
he might have gone on a page or two more to the Corollary: “Matter is the prime 
existent.” The existent had already been metaphysically deduced in the theorems 
on individuation, §§ 32-41, and though the ground/existence paradigm is 
employed in the Naturphilosophie, Schelling gave no indication that the 
paradigm structures the discussion as a whole. If the reader is not already familiar 
with the Naturphilosophie, that section of the My System can seem to be an add-
on, or worse, something wholly redundant. Unless one reads quite far into the 
discussion of nature, the work‟s overall structure cannot readily come into view, 
viz., where absolute identity infected with duplicity and restored to relative 
identity or totality—the metaphysics of identity, in short——is ground, matter 
the first existent, organism the second existent, and embodied intelligence 
(human being) the third. Schelling remarks in the 1804 Entire System that he had 
used the Spinozistic mode of exposition to briefly state what he wished to say 
and not to say what he did not wish to say. 
 On second view, however, there is a fairly tight connection between the 
four key thematic elements in the system: (1) the metaphysical consideration of 
the individual; (2) the structural identity of all the potencies; (3) the constructed 
line that symbolizes A = B or potentiated identity-in-difference, and (4) the 
construction of matter as the concurrence of opposite forces in three-dimensional 
space. Because absolute identity exists in the universe in the same way it exists in 
the individual,
34
 the individual is infinite in itself,
35
 or, relative to itself, it is 
totality or the universe.
36
 In the way it is or stands in being, as opposed to the 
way it is connected to and exhibits the universe, the individual entity is a 
connection of opposed factors, subjective and objective, and symbolized by A = 
B in contrast to the pure A = A of absolute identity. Its form of being is distorted 
identity, but it is expressed in all possible variations of potencies, so that it can be 
expressed as a line between A and B, or between the subjective and the 
objective.
37
 As it is posited or steps forth in being, the apparent individual is at 
one and the same time the relative identity of the factors, their relative duplicity, 
and their reunion as relative totality,
38
 or the line of identity, the angle of 
duplicity, and their union in the third dimension, existent as matter or filled 
                                                          
33 J. G. Fichte, “On the Presentation of Schelling‟s System of Identity,” PRFS, 122-133. 
34 Presentation of My System, § 39, 156. 
35 Ibid., § 40, 156. 
36 Ibid., 156-57. 
37 See § 46 and associated explanations and corollaries, PRFS, 159-160. 
38 Ibid., § 50, Erl.1, 160-61. 
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space.
39
 Schelling remarks, without apparent trace of irony, that though he could 
have done it other ways, he presented this proof because it was the shortest. 
 There is a great deal of ambiguity about this text in Naturphilosophie. 
We shall shortly return to the topic of the ambiguity of the three potencies and 
the questions of what they precisely designate.  
(i) Eckart Förster notes a confusion in earlier versions of the 
Naturphilosophie‟s construction of matter as to whether nature unfolds 
sequentially, as the schema of the three potencies suggests, or whether they exist 
all at once, nature popping into existence fully grown and manifesting all 
qualities and operations.
40
 We have seen the Dynamic Process treatise suggest 
that genetic method or construction involves taking the all-at-once character and 
translating it into stepwise explanation. In this text, the very murkiness of the 
potency structure—or to put it less kindly, the meandering though geometrical 
exposition—suggests that nature exists as a plenum of operations which operate 
simultaneously to do the same thing: demonstrate the non-being of difference. 
Even though there seems to be some telos or hierarchy in the first two potencies, 
or the domain of the first existent (matter), operationally nature always does the 
same: collapse difference into indifference.  
 (ii) A related problem infects this and other versions of 
Naturphilosophie. Since matter and space are coincident, there is no space 
without matter, and matter-space is singular, not plural. The operational or 
dynamic homogeneity of nature suggests the same thing: there is only one entity 
and in it there occurs only one operation: ontological deflation. Other texts 
suggest that nature might be inhabited by multiple centers of activity, but each of 
them perfectly monadic so that there is no genuine interaction, no inside/outside 
distinction, no effective plurality.
41
 It is obviously not the intention of 
Naturphilosophie to do armchair summation of the march of empirical science, 
nor to mimic the methods of the Newtonian experimentalists. 
 (iii) What do the potencies designate? Evidently anything that has the 
triadic structure of relative identity, duplicity and relative totality, and that is 
functionally recursive or repetitious. We have just seen that in the transition from 
metaphysics to nature, Schelling equates metaphysical and proto-geometrical 
properties: 
 
 Relative Totality Depth  |    
 Duplicity  Breadth  |=>  Matter (the First Existent)
 Relative Identity Length    |42 
 
 
                                                          
39 Ibid., § 51, Beweis and Zus., 162-63. 
40 Eckart Förster, Twenty-Five Years, 246. 
41 See the Axioms of Nature that begin the specialized Naturphilosophie of the 1804 System, SW, 
I/6, 279-280.  
42 This and all subsequent diagrams depict potentiation (or in Schelling‟s symbols, the progression 
from A1 to A2 and from A2 to A3) in a bottom to top manner, as Schelling presented them. 
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At a higher level of generality, the abstract proto-logical features are equated 
with: 
 
Organism 
Light 
Gravity 
 
In this text, it is not clear how these general features of nature as a whole match 
up with lower-level operational features or with domains of being. The 1804 
Complete System of Philosophy, and Nature-Philosophy in Particular marks 
these features off, along with space/matter, as primordial principles of natural 
being and devotes a special section, General Philosophy of Nature, to them, prior 
to any consideration of detailed natural operations. Gravity and light are there 
said to operate, respectively, as the ground of being and the cause of being.
43
 The 
most problematic feature of this presentation is the place of the three levels of 
dynamic process: 
 
Chemical Metamorphosis (Oxidation/De-oxidation) 
Electricity 
Magnetism (Cohesion) 
 
These factors are introduced into the discussion time and time again; they seem 
to be the drivers or „workhorse‟ features of inorganic nature. There are also 
moves to reduce dynamic levels of phenomena downward to cohesion or upward 
to chemical metamorphosis; it is difficult to discern which feature is more 
fundamental, especially since potencies are in some sense all repetitions of one 
and the same operation. Chemical interactions are seen to involve reciprocal 
changes in cohesion in the “chemical matters” or elements involved.44 In this 
text, Schelling makes no distinction between a non-apparent or constitutive level 
of dynamic process that is a universal feature of matter and makes matter fill 
space and a higher-level perceptible but regional version of the same that 
manifests as perceptible magnetism, electricity and chemical alteration, as do 
both the 1800 and 1804 versions of Naturphilosophie. If all of this were not 
complicated enough, Schelling seems to have two ontological paradigms 
operative in this text, in addition to the substance/attribute and attribute/mode 
distinctions inherited from Spinoza: 
 
   Form of Being ≈ Existence 
   Being [Essence ]≈ Ground 
 
                                                          
43 See SW, I/ 6, 266: Gravity is the ground of the being of particular things, light their cause. The 
former is the “in-breath of nature,” the latter “the outbreath.” Schelling compares them to the 
paternal and maternal principles of Eros in Plato‟s Symposium. 
44 See Presentation of My System, PRFS, 170-73 and 187.  
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The former schema was introduced in the opening paragraphs of the 1799 First 
Outline and is operative in all the metaphysical expositions of the so-called 
Identity Philosophy.
45
 The second appears in the Naturphilosophie of 1801 and 
1804, but only comes into prominence in the 1809 Essay on Freedom. 
 Finally, there is a commanding presence of Johann Wolfgang Goethe in 
this text. Schelling explicitly attempts to defend Goethe‟s color-theory, where 
light is said to be unitary, not composite, and the colored appearances of things 
are analyzed as epiphenomena that arise from the contrast of light and dark 
surfaces being viewed in close contiguity.
46
 Schelling uses the term 
metamorphosis that Goethe coined for the process of repeated expansion and 
contraction in the development of the archetypal plant to characterize chemical 
interactions, the highest level of dynamic process.
47
  
 
III. 
 
The 1804 Würzburg lecture manuscript for the Entire System of Philosophy and 
of the Philosophy of Nature in Particular remained unpublished in Schelling‟s 
lifetime. It is something of a patchwork, since its construction of the ideal world 
incorporates materials that Hegel would have heard in Jena. Schelling‟s editor-
son remarks of the Naturphilosophie that it is more specific than other published 
texts, and that its contents have been amplified; it now includes topics in 
chemistry, astronomy and physiology.
48
 The sixty-one sections on philosophy in 
general or the metaphysics of identity are more carefully stated and explained 
than the corresponding sections of My System. The opening pages present at least 
five distinct arguments about the nature of God or the absolute, viz., that: 
 
• knower and what is known are the same in the highest instance of 
 knowing 
• self-knowledge of that identity occurs only in reason 
• identity or immanent self-sameness is independent of anything 
 subjective or objective  
• God is his own self-affirmation, or has being in virtue of his very idea 
• the form of God‟s absolute self-affirmation is repeated in reason.49  
                                                          
45 First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature (1799), trans. Keith Peterson (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 2004), 13-14. 
46 Presentation, PRFS, 174-75, 183-84. 
47 See Eckart Förster‟s exposition of Goethe‟s theories of light and color and his schema of 
biological development in The Twenty-Five Years, 265-276. Though Schelling is quite conscious of 
the difference between Goethe‟s results and those of the atomists and experimenters that followed 
Newton, Förster maintains that Schelling was interested in imposing a priori categories and 
theoretical patterns upon phenomena in Naturphilosophie, while Goethe developed an empirical 
procedure of close and repeated inspection of phenomena—think of Hume‟s example of the 
missing shade of blue—that Förster deems intuitive understanding. 
48 SW, I/ 6, vii-viii. 
49 §§ 1-8, Zus., SW, I/6, 137-151. 
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 While Schelling begins to use the term “God” in at least a quasi-theistic 
sense in Philosophy and Religion, the word indicates only the Spinozistic deus 
sive natura here and is conceived in a fundamentally Spinozistic way as the 
identity of self-affirmation and what is affirmed, natura naturans and natura 
naturata. And while Schelling has obviously gone back to the Ethics again and 
pursued its Germanic translation in more detail, he has also carried forward the 
generic Platonism or Neo-Platonism of the Bruno in insisting that appearances 
have the ontological standing only of privation, of being infected by Nicht-
Wesen, non-being. The finite or the realm of appearance is precisely the relative 
being and non-being of the particular within the universe.
50
 “Considered in and of 
itself, nothing is finite.”51 
 When we turn to the philosophy of nature, there is a bit of a surprise. The 
framework features of nature and the preeminent items of the first two potencies 
(gravity and light) are set apart in a general Naturphilosophie. Each finite item is 
monadic, apparently in itself but constituted by external relations.  Being nothing 
in itself, it is but a mirror of the cosmos, hence a quantum of affirmation or 
activity allied to one of being-affirmed or passivity.
52
 As part of the affirmed, it is 
body and appears in space, the form of mere externality; as ensouled or part of 
the affirming, it is in time. The very forms of appearance express the non-being 
of things.
53
 Pure space combined with the point yields the line of time. The 
dimensions of space contracted to a point yield impermeability, and we have at 
least the simulacrum of Kant‟s idea of matter: occupied or impenetrable space.54 
The apparent materiality of the finite item of appearance is therefore a product of 
a process of expansion and contraction—the process that in the development of 
the plant Goethe termed metamorphosis. Schelling contrasts the purely active or 
productive character of this construction of matter with Kant‟s which depends on 
a mere concept of reflection: force or conatus, mere striving. He remarks how the 
item of appearance is like a rainbow, the infinite substance, as it were, refracted 
through the prism of non-being or particularity—a comment that unconsciously 
presupposes the Newtonian color theory, not Goethe‟s.55 
 Schelling articulates a non-mechanistic theory of matter and motion in 
order to argue that gravity is one of the primitive items of nature—not 
magnitude, nor mass, nor motion. Neither the substance of matter nor space itself 
is composite or even intrinsically divisible.
56
 Matter or material substance is the 
identity of unity and totality, and motion, the active or affirming side of matter; 
motion is the reciprocal projection (Ineinsbildung) of space and time into one 
another. After Spinoza, Schelling conceives motion-and-rest as one of the infinite 
                                                          
50 § 31, Zus., SW, I/6, 180-81.  
51 § 17, Fol., SW, I/ 6, 161. 
52 §§ 66-67, Erl., SW, I/6, 217-218. 
53 §§ 69-71, SW, I/ 6, 219-221. 
54 § 74, Proof-§ 76, Erl., Proof, SW, I/6, 222-225. 
55 § 76, Zus., Anm.1-§ 77, SW, I/6, 226-230. Goethe‟s theory assumes one views a colored surface 
through a prism, Newton‟s that one views the surface illuminated by passing light through the 
prism. 
56 § 83, SW I/6, 229. 
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attributes of God/nature. The passive “mass” that is the object of mechanism‟s 
calculations is abstracted from matter, which even as it appears in the inorganic, 
is as much self-moving as is the organism.
57
 The inertial mass that is the focus of 
mechanism is but passivity, inborn defect, “the original sin of matter.”58 Gravity 
is, therefore, the intrinsic relation of matter to its ground, infinite substance, not 
an externally communicated impulse which is the measure of one‟s finite body‟s 
influence on another, nor Newton‟s attractive force.59 Baader is credited for 
positing gravity as an independent force and refuting Kant‟s hypothesis of 
attractive force being “action at a distance.”60 The so-call law of gravity reveals 
that every point of the universe is the mid-point. Schelling remarks: 
 
 Hence the ground of gravity is the undiscoverable depth of nature itself,
 which can itself never step forth into daylight, that whereby everything 
 else is birthed and sees the light of day—the mysterious night, the fate 
 of all things, or the maternal principle, since all things are conceived in it  
 and born from it as their ground.
61
 
 
 The ideal counterpart of gravity is light, or the Lichtwesen; the two are 
the infinite attributes of nature, expressing the affirming and affirmed aspects of 
the one substance. While gravity, acting on passive mass or the mere res extensa, 
is the real filling of space, light is its ideal description.
62
 Unable to categorize its 
ideality accurately, Newton was driven to empirical nonsense in talking of the 
“immateriality of light”; it is reflection, not reason, which has recourse to 
empirical concepts and divides nature into “mater” and “spirit,” quixotically 
placing light with “dead matter.” Viewed in itself, light is the boundary of nature 
or the threshold of intelligence. Viewed together, the two principles of nature, 
light and gravity, are centrifugal and centripetal energies, light defining things in 
their particularity, gravity in their identity. Gravity is the ground of things, light 
their cause; the former defines the nicht-für-sich-Seyn of things, the latter their 
in-sich-selbst-Seyn.
63
 The varying relations of these two principles to another (the 
process of metamorphosis) establish the different levels or potencies in nature, 
and within the potencies, establish the Evolutionsreihe of natural phenomena.
64
 
 Space will not permit a detailed look at the “Specific Naturphilosophie.” 
Absent that, the best I can do is to reproduce Schelling‟s own diagram of the first 
two potencies, and complete it with the third. In contrast to the disorganization of 
the 1801 Naturphilosophie, which (charitably construed) can suggest that all 
natural process occur at once and are (metaphysically viewed) the same 
                                                          
57 § 85, Zus. 1-3, SW, I/6, 242.  
58 § 88, Zus., SW, I/6, 246. 
59 §§ 92-94, SW, I/6, 250-52. 
60 § 95, Erl. , SW, I/6, 254-55. 
61 § 97, Zus., SW, I/6, 256-257. This remark, and subsequent ones about light, seems to anticipate 
the Ground/Existent categorial scheme of the 1809 Essay on Freedom. 
62 § 103, SW, I/6, 263. 
63 § 105, Anm., SW, I/6, 266-67. 
64 § 108, Zus. and § 133, Zus., 3-§ 138, SW, I/6, 269, 299-305. 
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operation, the 1804 system, with its tight organization, detail, and ideal-real 
symmetry suggest that the processes are ordered teleologically toward the 
intelligence-nested-in-organism that is humankind and therefore unfold in a 
graduated sequence. 
 
  The Potencies in the 1804 Specific Naturphilosophie
65
 
 
    Third Potency 
 
   regarded in form regarded in substance 
 
Third Dimension sensitivity  animals 
Second Dimension excitability  protozoa 
First Dimension reproduction  plants 
 
    Second Potency 
 
   regarded in form regarded in substance 
 
Third Dimension chemical action  heat 
Second Dimension electricity  light 
First Dimension magnetism  sound 
 
    First Potency 
 
   regarded in form       regarded in substance 
 
Third Dimension spherical cohesion    hydrogen,oxygen: water 
Second Dimension relative cohesion (breadth)    phlogiston: air 
First Dimension active cohesion        sulfur: metals, fire 
 
    Figure 1 
 
Considerably more detail could be unpacked in the third potency, where a 
mirroring of the ideal and real breaks forth in phenomena such as sexual 
dimorphism or the symmetrical organization of animal physiology, and where the 
matters of sensitivity or perception (their real basis) are correlated with 
perceptual capacities (ideal bases): 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
65 Based on SW, I/6, 369 and 392-404. 
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   System of Sensation (Sinn)
66
 
 
Dynamic Process Sensory Basis/Perception Biological Function 
 
Magnetism  Hearing  Sound  Reproduction 
Electricity  Sight/Smell  Light   Excitability 
Chemism  Taste/Touch Heat  Sensitivity 
 
    Figure 2 
 
Sound is accounted the highest perception, since it is the perceptual vehicle of 
language, the body of thought. Both sight and smell communicate sensory 
information over a distance, while taste and touch are more local. Sensation and 
perception unite apparently internal and extra-somatic information in such a way 
that crude binary ideas of realism and idealism are refuted.  
                                                          
66 §§ 225-226, SW, I/6, 443-45. The order of the potencies is reversed here. Hearing/sound is said 
to be magnetism returned into itself, the first Ineinsbildung of the infinite into the finite. It is the 
basis of speech (Sprache), which is the instrument of reason (§ 232, SW, I/6, 454-55). “Speech is 
the highest item of nature: it is the [W/w]ord made flesh” (§ 259 Zus., SW, I/6, 491-492). 
